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The growing dependence of our society and economy on networked information 
systems makes it essential to protect our confidential data from being leaked by 
malicious code. Downloading and executing code (possibly from untrusted sources) 
has become a daily event. Modern operating systems load code for adding new 
functionalities; web browsers download plug-ins and applets; end-users download 
untrusted code for doing some useful tasks. Certification that the untrusted code 
respects the confidentiality of data it manipulates is essential in these situations. 
Thus it is necessary to analyze how information flows within that program.       
 
This thesis presents an approach to enable end-users to determine whether untrusted 
mobile code will respect pre-specified confidentiality policies by statically analyzing 
the untrusted code for secure information flow. The approach is based on adapting 
of a well-known approach, proof-carrying code (PCC) to information flow security 
and basing the security policy of PCC on a security-type system, which enforces 
information flow policy, namely noninterference security policy in RISC-style 
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assembly programs. The untrusted code is then analyzed for secure information flow 
based on the idea of PCC. The proofs that untrusted code does not leak confidential 
information are generated by the code producer and checked by the code consumer. 
If the proofs are valid, then the end-users (code consumer) can install and execute 
the untrusted mobile code safely. 
 
The proposed approach benefits from distinctive features that make it a very 
appropriate for security checking. First, it operates directly on object code produced 
by general-purpose off-the-shelf compilers. Second, it exploits the benefits that both 
type systems and proof-carrying code approaches offer and combines their strengths. 
Type systems provide an appealing option for implementing security policies, and 
thus represent a natural enabling technology of proof-carrying code. Meanwhile, 
proof-carrying code is an efficient approach for assembly code verification. Third, 
the explicit machine-checkable proofs serve as a certificate to distrustful users and 
give them more confidence in the security approach.  
 
The proposed security approach represents one point in the design space for mobile 
code security systems; it is well suited to typical Internet users. It enforces 
information flow policy with low preparation cost on the part of the code producer 
and no runtime overhead cost on the part of the code consumer. The security 
approach provides end-users with an adequate assurance of protecting the 
confidentiality of their confidential data. 
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Pertumbuhan kebergantungan masyarakat dan ekonomi ke atas sistem maklumat 
terangkai menyebabkan ianya penting untuk mengawal data rahsia daripada 
kebocoran oleh kod hasad. Memuat turun dan melaksanakan kod (mungkin daripada 
sumber tidak boleh dipercayai) telah menjadi amalan harian. Sistem pengoperasian 
moden memuat kod untuk menambah fungsian baharu; pelayar web memuat turun 
plug-in dan applets; pengguna akhir memuat turun kod tidak boleh dipercayai untuk 
melakukan beberapa tugasan penting. Pensijilan yang kod tidak boleh dipercayai 
menghormati kerahsiaan data yang dimanipulasi adalah penting dalam situasi begini. 
Oleh itu adalah perlu untuk menganalisa bagaimana maklumat mengalir dalam 
program tersebut. 
 
Tesis ini mempersembahkan satu pendekatan yang membenarkan pengguna akhir 
menentukan sama ada kod mobil yang tidak boleh dipercayai akan menghormati 
polisi prapenentu kerahsiaan melalui penganalisisan secara statik kod yang tidak 
boleh dipercayai untuk aliran maklumat yang selamat. Pendekatan ini berdasarkan 
penyesuaian pendekatan yang terkenal, kod membawa-bukti (PCC) ke keselamatan 
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aliran maklumat dan mendasarkan polisi keselamatan PCC ke atas sistem 
keselamatan-jenis yang menguatkuasa polisi aliran maklumat, khususnya polisi 
keselamatan tidak campur tangan dalam program himpunan stail RISC. Kod yang 
tidak boleh dipercayai kemudian dianalisis untuk keselamatan aliran maklumat 
berdasarkan ide PCC. Bukti bahawa kod yang tidak boleh dipercayai tidak 
membocorkan maklumat rahsia dijana dan diperiksa. Jika bukti adalah sah, maka 
pengguna akhir boleh memasang dan melaksana kod mobil yang tidak dipercayai 
secara selamat. 
 
Cadangan pendekatan ini mendapat manfaat daripada fitur tersendiri yang 
menjadikannya sangat sesuai untuk pemeriksaan keselamatan. Pertama, ia 
beroperasi secara terus ke atas kod objek terhasil melalui pengkompil off-the-shelf 
kegunaan umum. Kedua, ia mengeksploitasikan manfaat yang ditawarkan oleh 
kedua-dua pendekatan sistem jenis dan kod membawa-bukti dan menggabungkan 
kekuatan mereka. Sistem jenis menyediakan suatu opsyen yang menarik untuk 
melaksana polisi keselamatan, dan dengan itu mewakili teknologi kod membawa-
bukti terboleh secara semula jadi. Sementara itu kod membawa-bukti adalah suatu 
teknik yang efisyen untuk penentusah kod himpunan. Ketiga, bukti semakan mesin 
yang eksplisit digunakan sebagai sijil kepada pengguna yang dicuragai dan memberi 
mereka keyakinan yang lebih dalam pendekatan keselamatan. 
 
Pendekatan cadangan keselamatan ini mewakili satu titik dalam ruang reka bentuk 
sistem keselamatan kod mobil; ianya sangat sesuai untuk pengguna tipikal Internet. 
Ia menguatkuasakan polisi aliran maklumat dengan kos penyediaan rendah ke atas 
penghasil kod dan tiada kos overhed masa larian ke atas pengguna kod. Pendekatan 
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keselamatan menyediakan pengguna akhir dengan jaminan kukuh pengawalan 
kerahsiaan data sulit mereka. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 Background 
The growing dependence of our society and economy on networked information 
systems makes the organizations as well as individuals potential targets to computer 
security attacks. Moreover, the number of sources and targets of these attacks are 
growing fast day after day. Not only has the advancement of Internet complicated the 
task of protection mechanisms against computer security attacks but also made 
performing such attacks much easier than ever. Performing computer security attacks 
today does not need one to be a security expert because one can simply exploit 
existing tools and software available on the Internet (Sabelfeld, 2001). One of the 
computer security attacks that target organizations as well as users today is the attack 
of confidentiality, in which the malicious programs attempt to leak confidential data 
to intended parties. For the remainder of this thesis, when the term security is used, it 
means confidentiality.  
 
Recent years have witnessed a significant growth of interest in protecting 
confidentiality of information of organizations as well as individuals more 
particularly in presence of mobile code. Standard security mechanisms such as 
access control mechanisms, cryptography, antivirus and digital signature fail to 
provide a complete assurance of protecting confidentiality of information, and thus 
do not provide end-to-end security. Though access control mechanism is the normal 
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way to protect confidentiality of information, it is simple and in some cases is of 
limited use and tends to be restrictive. Cryptography provides an assurance about the 
source of the downloaded code and that it has not been compromised during 
transition but cannot ensure that the downloaded code has secure information flow. 
Antivirus tools searches for viruses signatures and do not concern confidentiality 
problem (Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003).  
 
The following motivating example demonstrates clearly the pitfall of access control 
mechanisms and shows their inadequacy to protect the confidentiality of information: 
assume that a piece of code has been downloaded off the network to perform some 
useful tasks. If this code has an access right to some user’s confidential data and 
needs to communicate over the Internet connection, it may leak confidential 
information through the Internet connection. In order to protect the confidentiality of 
information, the access control mechanism will prevent the code from accessing the 
Internet or private data or prevent it from accessing both. The access control 
mechanisms are of limited use here and cannot prevent the program from accessing 
the private data because the program uses the user’s access rights. Furthermore, this 
strategy is not suitable because it may prevent useful programs from doing their tasks 
and sacrifices some richness of the web. The crux of the problem is not in disabling 
the run of mobile code but how one can enjoy the functionalities provided by mobile 
code while protecting data confidentiality. 
 
Language-based approaches to security are promising in protecting data 
confidentiality (Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003). As they can access the program’s code, 
language-based security approaches can enforce fine-grained security policies and 
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express easily the behavior of the programs, and thus succeed where traditional 
access control mechanisms fail short. The class of language-based security 
approaches that can protect data confidentiality is called language-based approaches 
to information-flow security. These security approaches protects data confidentiality 
through analyzing the target programs for secure information flow. The concept of 
secure information flow is typically formalized in terms of what is known as 
noninterference (Goguen & Meseguer, 1982). Noninterference states that 
confidential data may not interfere with (affect) public data.  
 
Unfortunately, much of works on language-based information-flow security have 
been devoted to high-level languages with relatively less interest given to assembly 
languages (Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003). High-level languages approaches suffer from 
a potential flaw—the use of the compiler to check information flow. The compiler is 
a big, complex, and cannot be assured to be free of bugs. To avoid this potential 
weakness, it is required to check the code produced by compiler directly. Moreover, 
much of the code is distributed in the form of executables files and convincing the 
code suppliers to provide a code in a form amenable to high-level security checking 
as source code is not successful.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Protecting the confidentiality of information in the presence of mobile code is an 
increasing important problem (Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003). Mobile code refers to that 
sort of programs that are moved from one place to another over a network before 
being executed. Mobile code is normally shipped in low-level form (e.g., Windows 
executables), and hence it is appropriate to perform the security checking at assembly 
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level. Examples of mobile code are ActiveX, VBScript, and JavaScript. Mobile code 
is downloaded from the Internet (often from untrusted or partially trusted sources) 
adding new functionalities to modern computing systems or performing some useful 
tasks to end-users. However, the useful and powerful features that mobile code is 
offering come at a high price. Mobile code may leak sensitive information, and thus 
the computing systems that incorporate mobile code must protect their confidential 
information from being leaked by mobile code. 
 
From the viewpoint of our research work, existing approaches that attempt to protect 
the confidentiality of information by analyzing mobile programs fall into two main 
groups. Research works that deal with RISC architecture (e.g., Yu & Islam, 2005; 
Medel et al., 2005; Bonelli et al., 2004) and those that deal with Java bytecode (e.g., 
Barthe et al., 2006; Barthe & Rezk 2005; De Francesco & Martini, 2007). The 
approaches belong to the first group assume that mobile programs being checked are 
generated by certifying compilers. As a result these approaches are difficult to use 
for checking mobile programs generated by general-purpose off-the-shelf compilers, 
and thus prevents end-users from benefiting from such approaches to check a wide 
range of existing mobile programs. On the other side, the approaches that deal with 
Java bytecode are not suitable for checking programs written in high-level languages 
other than Java. Furthermore, none of these approaches generates explicit proofs 
(certificates) for the programs acceptable by them, and thus they do not explain to 
users why these programs are secure. The explicit proof, however, is a convincing 
way that provides a confidence that a program execution will not leak confidential 
information. The security proof serves as evidence to the users that a given program 
is truly secure and should be allowed to execute. 
